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Abstract 
We estimate the relation between union presence and executive compensation using a unique panel of 
executives in publicly listed US firms during the period 1992-2001. We find evidence that union 
presence is associated with lower levels of total executive compensation. We find this union effect to 
be primarily the result of substantially lower stock option awards, and to a lesser extent due to lower 
cash pay. Moreover, the negative relation between unionization and executive remuneration becomes 
larger at the higher end of the conditional distribution of executive remuneration. We also find that the 
elasticity of cash pay to financial performance is similar across unionized and non-unionized firms, 
and that union presence is associated with a more compressed intra-firm and inter-firm executive 
compensation structure. 
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“Boards have been placed under enormous pressure by the left-wing, anti-business press and 
the envious leaders of unions and other so-called ‘CEO Comp Watchers’, and therefore 
Boards are being forced to protect themselves irrespective of the potential negative long-term 
impact on public companies.” 
1 
 
Angelo Mozilo, Countrywide’s former CEO & Chairman 
 
1.   Introduction 
In their seminal paper on CEO compensation, Jensen and Murphy (1990) posited that political 
and regulatory constraints in publicly listed firms would work to truncate the upper tail of 
executive remuneration, resulting in lower overall levels of remuneration and reduced pay-
performance sensitivities. They referred to this as the implicit regulation effect and identified 
government legislation and the presence of unions as obvious examples of such institutional 
constraints. Several empirical studies have since confirmed Jensen and Murphy’s predictions for 
public firms operating in regulated industries, where government oversight and disclosure rules 
ensure that executive remuneration remains a highly visible and contentious subject.
2 Similar 
research, however, on the possible constraining effects of unions is scarce. This is surprising 
since anecdotal accounts of union opposition to executive compensation abound (e.g., against 
Donald J. Carty, the former CEO at American Airlines), while at the same time there could be a 
relation between the dramatic growth in executive compensation and the substantial decline in 
private sector union density (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997). Moreover, one would have assumed 
                                                 
1 Extract from an email to John England, a Towers Perrin consultant, in October 2006. The email was released by 
the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in the context of an 
examination of Mr. Mozilo’s compensation given that his company was implicated in the mortgage and banking 
crisis. 
2 An early test of the implicit regulation hypothesis can be found in Joskow et al. (1993), where CEOs in regulated 
industries in the United States receive substantially lower levels of pay. Joskow et al. (1993, 1996) also find that 
even within the already regulated electric utility industry, the level of CEO cash pay is negatively related to the 
degree of regulation. In terms of the pay-performance effects, Crawford et al. (1995) and Hubbard and Palia 
(1995) find increased CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity after deregulation in the banking industry, thus 
providing empirical support for the limitations on CEO compensation imposed by regulatory constraints.   3
that there would be a parallel body of work examining the impact of unions on executive 
compensation on a non-anecdotal manner, given organized labor’s interest in monitoring 
executive pay and in highlighting alleged executive excesses.  
One obvious reason for the scarcity of published research in this area is the difficulty in 
identifying clear causal links between union presence, which is found at an establishment level, 
and executive remuneration, which is set at the firm level. The other more important obstacle, up 
to now, has been the lack of a sizeable dataset matching union information with executive 
compensation data.
3  This paper fills this gap in the literature by using a unique sample of 
matched pairs of unionized/non-unionized publicly listed US firms, during the 1992-2001 period, 
in which the presence (or absence) of a union at the firm level is identified with appropriate 
workplace data (i.e., NLRB elections, FMCS contract expirations). Moreover, we offer evidence 
for both the CEO and other top managers (non-CEOs). 
Our results suggest that union presence is significantly associated with executive 
compensation. Specifically, we find that union firms display lower levels of total compensation 
for their executives (i.e., total compensation being the sum of salary, bonus, benefits, restricted 
grants, long term incentive plans, and stock options) as compared to non-union firms. We find 
this union effect to be primarily the result of substantially lower stock option awards, and to a 
lesser extent due to lower cash pay. The constraining effect of unionization on remuneration is 
also found to be stronger the higher-up in the distribution ladder one moves. However, we find 
that the elasticity of executive cash pay, with respect to firm performance, does not differ 
significantly between union and non-union firms. These results provide mixed support for the 
                                                 
3 The difficulty of matching (for the purposes of this paper) publicly listed firms with establishment-level data on 
unions is supported by DiNardo et al.’s (2000: p.18) statement that “matching the universe of [union workplace] 
contracts to the universe of firms is virtually impossible”.   4
implicit regulation hypothesis, therefore distinguishing union presence from regulatory 
oversight. 
Overall, this study is part of a growing research trend that examines the linkages between 
labor and finance at the firm level. In this sense, it contributes in several important ways to the 
empirical literature on incentives. First, our results empirically confirm the noted union aversion 
to stock-option incentive systems and indicate that unions possibly extend their influence 
throughout the corporate hierarchy, beyond those workers covered by union-negotiated wage 
scales. This is consistent with union preferences for remuneration compression within and across 
positions (Hirsch, 2008). Second, we provide evidence that despite overall union membership 
declines during the last several decades, union presence appears to be effective in its objectives.
4 
This could be attributed to unions’ increased use of proxy issue proposals as a result of the 1992 
SEC Proxy Reforms (Choi, 2000), and the increased pressure through union-controlled pension 
funds, which actively urge corporate governance reforms (Gillan, and Starks, 2000). Third, our 
paper appears to offer an alternative causal direction to that of Cronqvist et al. (2009), who used 
Swedish data to argue that both entrenched managers and unionized workers are extracting 
higher remuneration in poorly governed firms. In particular, they find that workers are paid more 
when CEOs are entrenched and less when CEOs have financial incentives through cash flow 
rights.
5 The higher worker wage creates private benefits for the CEO in the form of improved 
social relations with employees and reduced conflict during collective bargaining. Unlike 
Cronqvist et al. (2009), in the context of managerial entrenchment and rent extraction, our paper 
implies that unions and executives are competing for rent extraction.  
                                                 
4 In a similar fashion, Hirsch (2008) demonstrates that the union wage premium for workers has little fluctuation 
during the 1970-2006 period. 
5 Cronqvist et al. (2009) focus on union aggressiveness rather than union presence since 70% of the Swedish private 
sector workforce is unionized. In contrast, roughly 10% of the US private sector employees were unionized during 
our sample period.   5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews earlier studies on the topic, 
while Section 3 outlines the possible channels of union influence upon firm corporate 
governance, financial markets and ultimately on executive compensation. Section 4 describes 
how the dataset was constructed and provides an overview of the data. Section 5 analyses the 
results and discusses their relation to the analytical framework presented in section 3. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2.   Literature Review 
Although there is a substantial body of research examining the effect of unions on the workers’ 
wages (Blanchflower and Bryon, 2004), as noted in the introduction, only two published studies 
have estimated the effect of union presence within US firms on the level of CEO compensation. 
DiNardo et al. (2000) examined the effects of unionization in US firms for the periods 1971-74, 
1975-78 and 1979-82 on levels of CEO cash pay, but not for total compensation (i.e., they 
exclude the value of stock options).
6 The unionization data is for 1977 and 1987. They limited 
their study to unionized firms only and evaluated how the strength of unionization, measured in 
terms of union density at the firm level, affects CEO cash pay. DiNardo et al., (2000) initially 
found that greater levels of unionization were negatively and significantly associated with CEO 
cash pay. However, after controlling for industry and firm effects in alternative specifications, 
this relation became insignificant and in some cases positive. They characterized these particular 
findings as ‘extreme’ and attributed them to the inclusion of a later period (i.e., 1979-1982) in 
their data, although they admit that they did not have a satisfactory explanation as to why this 
period should differ from the rest of their sample.  
                                                 
6 A shorter version of DiNardo et al. (2000) appeared as a working paper at NBER in 1997 (DiNardo et al., 1997).   6
More recently, Banning and Chiles (2007) examine the relationship between union 
presence and CEO compensation by exploiting a cross-sectional sample of 170 firms from the 
Fortune 500 list in 1996. After collecting information on compensation and unionization from 
the companies’ SEC fillings, they find that union presence, as well as the unionization rate at the 
firm-level, are negatively related to both the level of total CEO compensation and the proportion 
of CEO compensation that is contingent on firm performance. However, the study’s cross-
sectional nature and empirical methodology do not provide a definitive view on the issue. In 
particular, SEC fillings do not necessarily reveal unionization status.
7 Also, the unionization rate 
at the firm-level is difficult to measure since employment figures in SEC fillings are typically 
based on full-time employees thus not representing the actual number of workers at the firm 
(e.g., temporary/seasonal workers). Furthermore, the authors utilize an OLS standardized 
regression framework even though their key dependent variable, the proportion of performance-
contingent CEO compensation, is fractional with a sizeable cluster of zeros. Moreover, by 
adjusting the dependent variables at the overly narrow 4-digit SIC level, the authors bias the 
adjusted values for 4-digit industries with very few observations, and overlook the fact that large 
firms are active in several other 4-digit SIC industries, which are also reported as secondary 
industry classifications in the firms’ financial statements. 
From a Canadian perspective, Singh and Agarwal (2002) examined the effect of union 
presence on CEO compensation with a cross-sectional sample of 86 Canadian mining and 
manufacturing firms listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1996. After controlling for firm 
performance and size, they found that union presence is associated with higher CEO cash pay, 
but not associated with other compensation components (e.g., stock options) and total 
                                                 
7 This is probably the reason why they find 17.6% of the firms to have union presence, compare to the 22.6% in our 
sample.   7
compensation. Nevertheless, the study’s narrow industrial focus and the US-Canada differences 
in attitudes towards unions restrict any definitive inferences on the topic.  
 
3.   The Link between Union Presence and Executive Remuneration 
There are two basic channels – one direct and the other indirect – by which unions are linked to 
executive compensation. The direct channel is based on the pressure that unions can bring to 
bare within the firm and its various establishments. This pressure, as noted by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) is exercised primarily through the voicing of fairness concerns and the threat of 
industrial disruption at the workplace, either of which would be expected to occur if union 
members perceive executive salaries as excessive.
8 Union pressure is normally observed during 
formal collective bargaining negotiations, but it can also be channeled informally through local 
stewards, public awareness campaigns and even through the sponsorship of journalism and 
public policy research critical of alleged managerial excesses. Moreover, from an information 
perspective, unions conduct and publicize salary surveys of workers and managers, all while 
going to great lengths to keep themselves informed about firms’ financial conditions (Bewley, 
1999). Union pressure for more constrained executive compensation can also be exercised 
through union-controlled pension funds, which are increasingly taking part in firms’ annual 
shareholder meetings and actively urging corporate governance reforms. Less frequently, union 
                                                 
8 The analytical justification for the direct channel is rooted in the work of Freeman and Medoff (1984), who in their 
seminal study of the role of organized labor in the US economy, argued that in addition to being a bargaining 
institution that raises wages for its members, unions can also act as an institutional counterbalance to managerial 
power, one that provides a structured means (i.e., a ‘voice’) for addressing employee concerns and securing 
fairness at work; in this case actualizing worker preferences for a more compressed compensation structure within 
the firm.   8
influence is gained through representation on the boards of directors, or other senior level 
committees.
9  
A further direct effect, put forward by Jensen and Murphy (1990), maintains that unions 
perceive high executive remuneration as a signal for the firm’s financial health and employ it as 
a justification for increased wage demands in labor negotiations. This would naturally make 
senior executives and boards more cautious when negotiating remuneration packages. This is 
also why union presence, much like the public oversight faced by executives of firms operating 
within regulated industries, is predicted by Jensen and Murphy to truncate executive 
remuneration and make it less sensitive to firm performance.  
The second channel by which unions and executive compensation are linked is indirect and 
relates to the adverse consequences that union presence can have on share price fluctuation, 
which, in turn, determines the value of the stock-related part of executive compensation. This 
particular channel is quite important given that stock options comprise a substantial part of top 
executive remuneration packages within publicly listed US companies. Unlike salary and bonus, 
which are fixed or accounting-based, stock-option compensation depends on financial 
performance measures. This means that if financial markets respond negatively towards union 
presence, then the incentive power of stock-related compensation for senior executives is 
reduced within unionized firms. 
Studies in the United States uniformly find that there is a negative relationship between 
union activity in a firm and its market value. Abowd (1989) examines share price movements in 
response to labor cost changes and concludes that increases in labor costs due to collective 
bargaining reduce a firm’s market value. Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) find that formal union 
                                                 
9 The practice is common in Japan and Germany, and even present in Canada and the UK. However, it is still rare in 
the US and found mostly when unions participate in broad-based ESOP plans.   9
organizing within establishments owned by a parent firm significantly lowers that firm’s equity 
value. They also find that the reduction in firm equity value due to petitions that lead to union 
wins in NLRB elections is almost three times bigger compared to petitions that lead to union 
losses in the year after the certification date. Historical research focusing on the interwar period 
also confirms the large and significantly negative effect of strikes and workplace disputes on 
stock values (DiNardo and Hallock, 2002).
10  
By and large, it appears that financial market antipathy toward union presence stems not so 
much from adverse productivity effects or lower R&D spending,
11   but rather from the 
expectation that union influence over a firm’s governance leads to inflexibility and greater 
redistribution of rents toward workers. Unionized firms (or even firms that have been the targets 
of organizing drives) are perceived as having to devote considerable resources to dealing with 
unions, or in trying to counteract their spread within the organization.
12 These labor constraints 
result in unionized firms’ reduced share price fluctuations, which could potentially necessitate a 
different dividend policy to signal future profitability to investors. This point is reflected in our 
sample of matched pairs of unionized and non-unionized firms (see Section 4.2), in which we 
find that they have an average (median) volatility of their stock returns over the previous sixty 
months of 0.32 (0.29) and 0.35 (0.32), respectively. Also, the median dividend yield (3-year 
                                                 
10 Union activity in one firm also seems to have negative spillover effects on the equity price of other firms in the 
same industry, presumably because union activity in one firm may increase the threat of unionization in others (a 
result also found in DiNardo and Hallock, 2002). Findings by Bronars and Deere (1994) reinforce this pattern and 
show that the petition for union representation in one firm has a substantial negative impact on the share price of 
other firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry group. 
11 The well-established negative impact of union presence on a firm’s share price described above has not been met 
with equally straightforward results for other firm activities and outcomes such as R&D spending or productivity. 
For instance, Connolly et al. (1986) and Hirsch (1992) suggest that union power has a negative effect on R&D 
spending, thus impeding innovation and the long-term profitability of the firm. However, Bronars et al. (1994) 
find that such a relation becomes insignificant after controlling for industry effects or estimating with first-
differences. In a similar fashion, the large body of work concerning union effects on firm level productivity has 
produced mixed results [see Hirsch (2007) for a detailed review]. 
12 Empirical evidence on firms’ cost of fighting labor organization is provided in Abowd and Farber (1990) and 
Freeman and Kleiner (1990).   10
average) is 1.72% for unionized firms and 1.13% for non-unionized firms.
13 Given the similarity 
of the remaining characteristics of executive stock options (i.e., non-tradable, 10-year maturity 
period, vesting period between 1-3 years, exercise price equal to the share price at the time of the 
issue), the indirect effect of union presence on executive remuneration materializes in the form 
of lower stock option value, due to the lower share price volatility and the higher dividend rate of 
unionized firms.  
Overall, we expect to find that union presence in firms is associated with reduced levels of 
executive remuneration, particularly at the upper tail of the remuneration distribution. As 
suggested by the implicit regulation hypothesis, we also expect unionized firms to display lower 
pay-performance elasticity for their executives’ cash pay compared to non-unionized firms. 
Finally, we hypothesize that union aversion to inequality will be associated with less dispersed 
executive compensation both within-firms and across-firms.  
 
4.   Sample Design 
This section describes how we merge a firm-level dataset on executive compensation and an 
establishment-level dataset on union activity, in order to create a merged dataset containing 
compensation information for the CEO and the four highest-paid managers. It also explains our 
focus on matched pairs of union-nonunion firms, in order to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
 
4.1.  Combining datasets 
                                                 
13 S&P Execucomp offers these figures on volatility (bs_volat) and dividend rate (bs_yield), which are used in 
calculating Black-Scholes values for executive stock options. The difference in the mean/median for these two 
variables across unionized and non-unionized firms in our sample is statistically significant at the 1% level. Also, 
we observe zero dividend yield (3-year average) in 21% (31%) of the firm-year observations for unionized (non-
unionized) firms in our sample of matched pairs. Moreover, the vast majority of executive stock options in our 
sample have 10-year maturity period and an exercise price which is equal to the share price at the time of the 
issue.   11
Data on executive compensation and firm characteristics are obtained from the Standard and 
Poors (S&P) Executive Compensation database (Execucomp).
14 Our initial sampling pool began 
with 119,518 observations on executive compensation (15,069 CEO observations and 104,449 
non-CEO observations) found in Execucomp during the 1992-2001 period. After dropping 
observations from non-US firms and observations containing missing variables for key 
independent variables utilized in this paper (namely, firm sales, return on assets and return to 
shareholders), we drop observations that correspond to less-than-annual compensation.
15 In the 
case of CEOs, we identify these observations using the information provided in Execucomp on 
CEO tenure. For non-CEO executives, we identify these observations utilizing a number of 
sources, namely successive editions of the S&P Register of Corporations, Directors and 
Executives, corporate websites, proxy statements and Hoovers.com.
16  Also, given that firms 
report a variable number of executives each year, for uniformity purposes in estimations, we 
keep only observations for the CEO and the four highest-paid non-CEO executives (hereafter 
referred to as Managers).
17 In this way, we create a dataset that uniformly contains all annual 
compensation information for the CEO and the four highest-paid managers in each firm-year. 
This final dataset contains 46,465 executive-year observations (9,293 CEO-years and 37,172 
Manager-years), which come from 2,070 firms and 16,416 executives. 
                                                 
14  Execucomp delivers data on executive compensation provided by the various US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filings, as a result of an SEC regulation change in 1992 for firms in the S&P 1500 index and 
other supplemental S&P indices. Typically, it contains official compensation data for up to five of the highest paid 
executives in each firm. 
15 It is important to drop observations with non-annual compensation not only because it is pro-rated, but also 
because it typically includes transition perquisites (e.g., severance pay, signing bonus). 
16 We also verify continuing tenure of managers by whether they re-appear in SEC fillings of that firm in some 
subsequent year. For this purpose we explore Execucomp observations up to fiscal year 2006. However, we 
constrain the sample in the 1992-2001 period because the union data available from Bureau of National Affairs 
(BNA) extends to 2001. 
17 In particular, 35% of the firms in Execucomp (during the 1992-2001 period) report less than five executives' 
compensation and 10% of the firms report more than seven executives' compensation.   12
Executive remuneration is measured in terms of cash pay (i.e., the sum of salary and 
bonus), Black-Scholes value of stock options awarded each year, and finally total compensation 
(i.e., the sum of salary, bonus, benefits, LTIPs, restricted grants and stock options). Examining 
Figure 1, drawn from the final dataset, provides a revealing picture of executive compensation in 
the United States during the 1990s. The most striking features are the growth of total 
compensation, the constancy of cash pay levels, and the remuneration gap between managers and 
CEOs. The growth in total compensation can be attributed to the dramatic increase in stock 
options, both in terms of usage and magnitude. In addition, the sizeable difference between the 
mean and median value of total compensation provides evidence that some executives enjoyed 
exceptionally large stock option contracts, thus skewing the compensation distribution and 
attracting considerable public attention. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The key explanatory variable in the dataset is union presence (UNIONi=0/1), which is an 
indicator variable taking on the value 1 if the firm i had any establishments that were unionized, 
and 0 otherwise. In other words, a firm is considered unionized if it has at least one unionized 
establishment linked to the parent company.
18 We identify unionized establishments using the 
Bureau of National Affairs’ (BNA) union activity data archive, from which we obtain 
information on a multitude of union activity variables, namely contract listings and NLRB 
elections with ‘win’ outcomes (and in some cases work stoppages and unfair labor practice 
petitions) that demonstrate evidence of union presence in 220,380 establishments in the United 
States between 1990 and 2002. Then, by determining a discrete time dimension for each activity 
                                                 
18 Despite the seemingly low threshold for union presence in a firm, it is the most appropriate since establishments 
can be quite large in size, and since in the majority of unionized firms in the sample (i.e., 62%) we identify two or 
more unionized establishments that belong to the firm. Unfortunately, we cannot create a firm-level union-density 
variable because the Execucomp/Compustat variable on full-time employment is not representative of the actual 
number of workers at the firm and because BNA has a substantial portion of missing values for number of 
unionized workers at the establishment level.   13
entry and sorting the establishments that corresponded to firms included in Execucomp, we were 
able to consolidate information on establishments belonging to the same firm. We match the 
firm-level data from Execucomp with the establishment-level data from BNA.  
The time-consuming sorting and matching process between establishment-level BNA data 
and the firm-level Execucomp dataset was constructed and verified both mechanically (i.e., 
software assisted) and manually. This dual approach was undertaken in order to tackle matching 
problems arising from such things as variations in company names and abbreviations, and in 
order to identify establishments that had similar names with listed firms, but belonged to 
unrelated private companies. These functions were carried out with information from Hoovers 
Online, Dun & Bradstreet’s Online, Harris Info-Source on firm establishments, firms’ annual 
statements, and firms’ official websites. 
Notably, even though we determine a discrete time dimension for each union activity entry 
before the BNA-Execucomp matching, the output firm-level indicator on union presence is 
essentially time-invariant (UNIONi rather than UNIONit). This can be attributed to two factors: 
continuously updated union contract listings and multiple unionized establishments in firms with 
union presence. This pattern is also consistent with studies emphasizing the rarity of union 
decertification at the establishment level in the United States during the 1990s (Nilsson, 1997).  
Using the constructed indicator on union presence, Table 1 offers an overview of union 
presence by industry in our sample. Consistent with US labor market union density data by 
industry, we observe that union presence at the firm-level is more evident in particular industries. 
For instance, substantial presence is found within the manufacturing sector, while only traces of 
union presence are found in the financial industry.  
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
   14
4.2.  Selecting matched pairs 
Sectors with union presence might have different production technologies that require different 
type of executive talent or organizational structures. Hence, one has to differentiate between the 
pure union effect and the influence of other observable and unobservable factors correlated with 
union presence. We focus our analysis on matched pairs of unionized and non-unionized firms, 
in order to match the distribution of managerial skills between unionized and non-unionized 
firms. More specifically, firm size and industry classification are widely used during 
compensation-setting as a proxy for managerial skill requirements, while personal characteristics 
such as age, experience and education are sidelined (Murphy, 1999).
19 At the same time, union 
presence is unlikely to be correlated with individual characteristics of executives because, unlike 
lower-level workers, executives are not union members and are not covered by collective 
agreements. Moreover, the top five executives, which are the focus of this study, hold similar 
positions across firms (e.g., CEO, President, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer, 
Treasurer), thus revealing comparable duties. Also, as a matter of fact, in our sample, there is 
evidence of managerial mobility between the two types of firms (i.e., with and without union 
presence) in both directions.
20 Lastly, unlike the private-public sector choice whose endogeneity 
has been well-established in the labor economics literature, all firms in the sample belong to the 
private sector thus being uniformly exposed to product market competition. Based on the 
                                                 
19 Unlike blue-collar and lower-level professional jobs, for which unionized firms attract more skilled persons, 
general human capital variables (e.g., schooling years and standardized test scores) have little effect on managers, 
whose labor skill is typically assessed from aggregate firm performance rather than human capital requirements 
and piece-rate output. 
20 There are 148 executives in our sample who are observed to have moved from a non-union company to a union-
company, or vice-versa. Although this number may appear small (about 1% of the total number of executives in 
this study), one has to bear in mind that it underestimates actual managerial mobility between companies due to 
the nature of available data in Execucomp. Notably, Execucomp typically has information for the top-five paid 
executives, meaning that a substantial part of managerial mobility is unobserved since managers that were in the 
top-five tier in one company, need not be in the top-five tier in the next company (and vice-versa).   15
aforementioned, in contrast to lower-level employees, executives are unlikely to self-select into a 
publicly listed firm based on the criterion of union presence.  
We construct the matched pairs of firms by utilizing the nearest-neighbor matching 
algorithm from Abadie et al. (2004). More specifically, we seek to match each unionized firm 
with a unique non-unionized firm that operates in the same year, in the same industry (2-digit 
SIC), and that has quite similar firm size (in terms of market value, sales and assets) and firm 
performance (in terms of return on assets and return to shareholders). The pairs are also matched 
in terms of three CEO characteristics that have been widely found to influence compensation 
patterns; whether the CEO is also Chairman of the Board, the founder of the firm, or a relative of 
the founder. Two samples of executives in unionized and non-unionized firms are created from 
the pairs of matched firms.
21 Each of the two samples contains 773 firm-year observations (i.e., 
773 CEOs and 3796 Managers). In sum, after matching on observables, we control for a large 
part of observed managerial quality and skill (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Murphy, 1999), thus 
creating two comparable populations of executives that differ only in that they work either in a 
firm with or without union presence. A full listing of the aforementioned variables, along with 
means and standard deviations, can be found in Table 2. Notably, the matched pairs sample 
generally reflects the wider sample, with the exception of industry composition (see Tables 1 and 
2). This is anticipated since it is difficult to find matched-pairs in industries with scarce union 
presence. We also exclude regulated utilities (SIC 49) from the matching process, in order to 
distinguish between union presence and regulatory oversight. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
                                                 
21 In order to avoid poor matching, we drop 10% of the matched pairs with the poorest matching score, as measured 
by the distance metric. Post-matching mean and median tests for the two groups of unionized and non-unionized 
firms indicate no statistically significant difference for all the variables utilized as matching criteria at any 
conventional significant level. Notably, we also remove utility firms (SIC 49) from the matching process, given 
that the executive compensation in those firms is subject to regulatory pressures.   16
 
5. Empirical Strategy and Results 
We evaluate the association between union presence and senior management incentives in four 
stages as follows. First, we check for the relation between union presence and levels of executive 
compensation. We then evaluate whether that relation is affected by endogeneity and 
heterogeneity concerns. Based on our analysis in Section 3, it is expected that unions would be 
associated with lower levels of stock-option rewards, balanced by higher levels of cash pay 
compensation. We also examine the alignment of executive incentives to shareholder interests in 
unionized and non-unionized firms by estimating the pay-for-performance relation. To the extent 
that incentives are misaligned in the presence of unions, unionized firms should display lower 
pay-performance elasticity. Finally, we examine whether union presence is associated with a 
more compressed cross-firm distribution of executive compensation both within-firms and 
across-firms. This effectively tests whether the well-documented spillover properties of the union 
compression on employees’ salaries extend to the top of the hierarchy. 
 
5.1.  Unions and level of executive compensation 
We test whether union presence is significantly related with the levels of executive cash pay and 
total compensation for firm i at time t using the following specifications, separately for CEOs 
and Managers: 
[1]    it i it i it Industry Z UNION on Compensati Total 2 1 1 1 1 )   ln(              
[2]    it i it i it Industry Z UNION Pay Cash 2 2 2 2 2 )   ln(              
where   is the intercept term,  i UNION  is the indicator variable indicating union presence,  it Z  is 
a vector of control variables on executive and firm characteristics,  i Industry   is a vector of   17
industry controls (2-digit SIC), and    specifies the error terms. In particular, the control 
variables involve stock ownership, board presence (Chairman or member of the board), firm size 
(natural logarithm of total sales), as well as accounting and financial performance.  
We also perform estimations with stock-option compensation as the dependent variable. In 
terms of econometric methods, while in [1] and [2] we employ OLS regression, for stock-option 
compensation we follow Cragg’s (1971) two-tier estimation, given that 22.5% of the CEOs and 
22.9% of the Managers in our sample involve firm-year observations with no stock option 
component.
22 The specification for the first-tier reflects parameters influencing the adoption of 
stock option awards, namely stock ownership, firm riskiness (i.e., three-year standard deviation 
of monthly returns), industry effects and year effects. The specification for the second-tier 
contains the  it Z  and  i Industry  vectors, discussed in [1] and [2]. 
Table 3 presents the findings for levels of total compensation and its two major 
components (i.e., cash pay and stock options) across union and non-union firms. We find strong 
evidence that union presence within a firm is significantly associated with all three compensation 
(dependent) variables. Specifically, union presence is significantly associated with 12 percent 
lower total compensation for both CEOs and Managers.
23  As hypothesized, the negative 
association with total compensation occurs because of the large negative impact of union 
presence on stock-option compensation, an impact which dominates the much smaller negative 
union impact on cash pay especially given that stock option awards generally constitute a 
substantial part of total compensation. Given that there is negligible difference in the binary 
incidence of stock option awards across unionized and non-unionized firms in our sample, we 
                                                 
22 Cragg’s (1971) two-tier model addresses the main shortcoming of the Tobit model that the factors affecting the 
two stages of the choice are identical. Moreover, the results are robust to alternative estimations that control for 
selection of firms choosing to offer stock options, such as the two-part estimation, Heckman estimation with the 
inverse Mills ratio, and Tobit. 
23 The effects are found with the following formula:  1 e
  , where  is the respective union presence estimate.   18
can attribute this significant difference in total compensation across firm types to differences in 
the size of the stock option awards.
24 Finally, the coefficients for the control variables have signs 
consistent with expectations when significant. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5.2.  Robustness checks 
5.2.1 Heterogeneity of union estimate 
As an added check of our results and as a straightforward test of whether unions have a greater 
effect on the upper tail of the executive compensation distribution, we employ a quantile 
regression on specifications [1] and [2]. By using this approach one can detect any heterogeneity 
in the union estimate over executive remuneration since regression parameters are allowed to 
vary across different points in the conditional distribution. As Koenker and Xiao (2002: p. 1583) 
suggest “[b]y supplementing least squares estimation of conditional mean functions with 
techniques for estimating a full family of conditional quantile functions, quantile regression is 
capable of providing a much more complete statistical analysis of the stochastic relationships 
among random variables.” 
Table 4 presents the estimates from the median regression on total compensation. The 
median effects, for both the CEOs and the Managers, are similar to the average impact reflected 
in our initial OLS estimation. However, the heterogeneity is pronounced when we illustrate the 
coefficient estimate for union presence across the conditional distribution. The results, graphed 
in Figures 2 and 3, suggest that the negative association between unions and executive 
remuneration is much stronger as we move up the compensation ladder. That is, unions appear to 
                                                 
24 More specifically, 76% and 78% of the Managers in the matched unionized and non-unionized firms, respectively, 
are awarded stock options. The portion of CEOs receiving stock options in unionized and non-unionized firms is 
77% and 78%, respectively.   19
significantly limit the upper tail of the compensation distribution much more than the lower tail, 
as Jensen and Murphy (1990) predict. For instance, union presence is associated with 15% (15%) 
lower level of total compensation for CEOs (Managers) at the 0.7 conditional quantile, as 
compared to only 9% (10%) at the 0.3 conditional quantile (see Figure 2). Both coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. In Figure 3, the quantile regressions for 
cash pay reveal even more heterogeneity, given that the union presence’s coefficient estimate for 
CEOs (Managers) is statistically insignificant at the 5% level in the first four (two) conditional 
quantiles.  
Overall, the negative union effect with respect to executive remuneration strengthens as we 
move to the upper tail of the conditional remuneration distribution, thus providing evidence in 
support of Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) assertion that unions are particularly concerned with 
constraining high-end remuneration packages that ‘super-star’ executives often can command.  
[Insert Table 4 and Figures 2/3 about here] 
 
5.2.2.  Union presence as an endogenous variable 
In this subsection we treat  i UNION  in equation [1] as an endogenous variable. One could 
argue that unions are more likely to organize firms with substantial rents, which in turn could 
also affect the choice of executive incentives. Thus, for robustness purposes, we account for 
possible endogeneity of union presence by utilizing firm-specific instrumental variables 
concerning the location of company headquarters and the age of the firm. 
The location of company headquarters has been found to influence union presence given 
the variation in state-level labor regulation and union approval (Herod, 1998; Holmes, 2006). To 
capture these effects we utilize two indicator variables: RIGHT-TO-WORK in order to identify   20
companies that are headquartered in states with right-to-work laws, effectively proxying for anti-
union bias (Davis and Huston, 1995; Moore, 1998), and RUST-BELT in order to identify 
companies that are headquartered in an area traditionally friendly to unions (Lopez, 2004).
25 We 
focus on headquarter location because a firm’s headquarters are typically in close proximity to its 
establishments for transportation/communication considerations, and because headquarter 
location could be indicative of the firm’s organizational culture, especially towards trade unions. 
Exemplifying this point, during our sample period, the nonagricultural private-sector union 
density in the ‘right-to-work’ states and ‘rust-belt’ states was 5.1% and 14.7%, respectively, 
while in the rest of the United States it was 11.7%.
26 
Firm age is important since firm-wide union decertification events are rare (Nilsson, 1997), 
meaning that firms established before the union-busting era of the 1980s are more likely to be 
observed as having union presence during our sample period (Fiorito, 2007; Palley and 
LaJeunesse, 2007). Reflecting this change in unionization, during the 1965-1980 period, union 
density averaged 26%, while in the period 1981-2001 it averaged 15%. In calculating firm age, 
we use as the date of origin the date that each firm appears either in the Compustat dataset or the 
CRSP files; when there is substantial difference between Compustat and CRSP, we choose the 
earlier date (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003).  
                                                 
25 RIGHT-TO-WORK is a indicator variable taking value 1 if the firm has its headquarters in a state with right-to-work 
laws (namely AL, AZ, AR, FL, GA, ID, IA, KS, LA, MS, NE, NV, NC, ND, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA and WY), 
and 0 otherwise. RUST-BELT is a indicator variable taking value 1 if the firm has its headquarters in a rust-belt state 
(namely IL, IN, MI, OH, PA, and WV), and 0 otherwise. Firm headquarters located in the remaining states serve 
as the omitted group. We opted to utilize these three dummies rather than state-specific dummies because 
observations would drop from the sample due to perfect prediction (e.g., if all firms headquartered in a specific 
state are non-union, their respective observations would be dropped from the sample). Also, the IV estimator 
(2SLS) has large biases when numerous instruments are used. Information on firms’ headquarters location is 
included in Execucomp. 
26 Union density is averaged by state and weighted by employment. The source of union density data is Hirsch and 
Macpherson (2003).   21
Table 4, Columns 3 and 4, present the IV (2SLS) estimates for the levels of executives’ 
total compensation. The fact that an endogenous variable (i.e., union presence) is binary is not 
influenced by the first-stage linear regression, which still produces consistent IV estimators 
(Heckman and Robb, 1985). We find strong evidence that union presence within a firm is 
negatively related to total compensation for both the CEO and the Managers. Notably, after 
controlling for potential endogeneity, the estimated coefficients are much larger than those from 
the OLS/Median regressions. This is typical of instrumented variables and could be attributed to 
unobserved differences between unionized and non-unionized firms. Nevertheless, the fact that 
all three estimation methods yield uniform results in terms of sign and statistical significance 
offers strong evidence for a different structure of executive remuneration in unionized firms.  
 
5.3.  Pay-performance elasticity 
In order to assess whether unionized firms have distorted incentives alignment in their 
executives’ remuneration, we estimate the relation between executive cash pay and firm’s market 
performance. If union presence within firms distorts managerial incentives, as Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) predict, we would expect to find lower pay-performance relation for managerial 
compensation in unionized firms. The first-difference OLS regression specification for 
estimating the pay-performance elasticity for executive cash pay is as follows: 
[3]    jit i i it it jit UNION UNION SV SV               3 2 1 0 ln ln ) Pay Cash  ln(        
where the independent variable is the percentage change in the cash pay compensation for 
executive j in firm i at year t, while  1   indicates the pay-for-performance estimate associated 
with changes in shareholder value  ) ln ( SV  , and  2    denotes the slope-effect on pay-for-
performance from union presence. We opt for pay-performance elasticity, rather than sensitivity,   22
because it reduces the impact of firm size bias and better illustrates linearity in agency contracts. 
Following Murphy (1999), the change in shareholder value equals the continuously accrued rate 
of return,  ) rs Shareholde   Return to 1 ln(   . Also, following Conyon and Murphy (2000: p. 661), the 
effect of the binary variable is captured by interacting the union presence dummy with the firm 
performance measure. Remuneration elasticity to financial performance is estimated only for 
cash pay since Managers’ wealth is much less related to the firm’s share price compared to the 
CEO wealth. In particular, Managers receive substantially less stock-related compensation 
compared to their CEO and they have much lower stock ownership than the CEO.
27 Moreover, 
estimating the performance sensitivity of stock options is not straightforward since it requires 
assumptions on the executives’ risk aversion, wealth and diversification. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 demonstrates that performance elasticity of cash pay with respect to market 
performance is positive and significant, while  2   and  3  are found to be statistically insignificant 
at the 10% level. Notably, the results do not change even if we would control for firm risk in the 
specification. These estimates suggest that union presence has no significant effect on the 
alignment of executive incentives, thus casting doubt on one aspect of Jensen and Murphy’s 
(1990) assertion that unions inhibit efficient executive incentive design due to their demands for 
wage fairness and a re-allocation of rents. Unlike regulatory pressures, which have been found to 
dramatically reduce executive compensation and its performance sensitivity, union presence 
                                                 
27 Cash pay is a major component of executive remuneration, representing 44% and 35% of the total compensation 
for Managers and CEOs, respectively. The respective proportion of stock option compensation is 39% and 48%, 
while 23% of the executive-year observations in our sample reflect zero stock option awards. In absolute dollar 
amount, the median stock-option award for senior managers and CEOs is $150,257 and $479,107 respectively (in 
1992 dollars). Furthermore, the median percentage of the company’s shares owned by Managers and CEOs in our 
sample is 0.04% and 0.29%, respectively.   23
appears to moderately reduce executive remuneration, but without any apparent sacrifice in the 
alignment of executive incentives to firm performance.  
 
5.4. Intra-firm and inter-firm dispersion of executive compensation 
The degree of remuneration inequality within a firm is an important determinant of 
organizational performance. As Lazear (1989) illustrates in his model of industrial politics, 
remuneration equality can be desirable on efficiency grounds when workers worry about 
reference groups and cooperation is necessary in production. Among labor market institutions, 
organized labor has been found to reduce remuneration dispersion not only for its members, but 
also for employees in non-unionized firms through a spillover mechanism. Lack of pay fairness 
(actual or perceived) within unionized environments can therefore produce adverse effects, such 
as the production of defective goods (Krueger and Mas, 2004), reduction in job performance 
(Mas, 2006), and interference with strategic plans (Kole and Lehn, 2000). Could the presence of 
unions and associated remuneration compression preferences also extend throughout an 
organization’s corporate structure, including to managers in the upper echelon of the firm? In the 
following two sub-sections we examine whether union presence is associated with reduced 
remuneration dispersion both within-firms and across-firms. 
 
5.4.1.  Unions and dispersion of executive compensation within firms 
In this sub-section we examine whether there are differences between unionized and non-
unionized firms in terms of compensation differentials between the CEO and the top managers. 
This differential can be measured by the distance in remuneration within the top echelon inside 
the firm. Distance is defined as the difference between CEO remuneration and the mean   24
remuneration for the four highest-paid managers in firm i at time t,   it Managers CEO it W W Dist   . 
Distance is measured for both cash pay and total compensation. The transformed value of the 
distance measure is then regressed against union presence and a number of relevant control 
variables.
28 Put formally: 
[4]    it i it i it Industry Z UNION              1 0 Distance                    
, where  0   is the intercept term,  i UNION  is the indicator variable indicating union presence,  it   
is a vector of control variables on CEO characteristics and firm characteristics,  i Industry  
corresponds to a vector of 2-digit SIC industry effects, and   specifies the error term. Given 
unions’ aversion to inequality, we expect that  1   will be negative. CEO characteristics that could 
positively influence the distance measure are CEO/Chairman duality (due to dual responsibilities 
and task complexity), founder status (reflecting possible entrenchment), CEO tenure and age (the 
marginal returns for the CEO’s human capital may be different than those for Managers), and 
CEO stock ownership (incentives are better aligned for CEOs with higher ownership). Also, the 
participation of top managers in the board of directors would improve their compensation, thus 
reducing the differential with the CEO. In terms of firm characteristics, we include firm size and 
performance which are expected to have a positive sign given the norms of proportionality 
between successive levels in organizational hierarchies (Mahoney, 1979; Simon, 1957). 
Importantly, our estimations deal with the monetary value of the distance measure, rather than on 
the CEO remuneration ‘slice’ (i.e., the CEO’s remuneration divided by the total remuneration for 
                                                 
28  Negative outliers reflect 1.6% of the sample for cash pay differentials and 4.1% of the sample for total 
compensation differentials. Due to the presence of negative outliers, for the transformation of distance values we 
utilize the inverse hyperbolic sine function (Burbidge et al., 1988) that not only yields very similar results to those 
of the logarithmic function for positive numbers, but also transforms negative numbers. Negative distance values 
occur in cases of CEOs who have substantial wealth, mostly due to their founder status in the firm, and are 
employed for substantially less compensation than their counterparts. For instance, Apple’s CEO Steve Jobs 
symbolically receives $1 as annual salary.    25
the top five executives of the firm) because the latter measure is fractional, highly leptokurtic 
with fat tails, and it does not distinguish cases in which all top executives in a firm are overpaid. 
Due to the presence of negative outliers skewing the distribution, OLS estimation would 
produce inefficient estimates. As a result we utilize robust estimators, namely quantile 
regression, and robust regression with M-estimation and Huber weighting. The benefit of 
quantile regression is that it examines the impact of union presence on the entire conditional 
distribution of executive remuneration, rather than as a single central tendency measure. Also, 
robust regression downweights influential outliers, while closely approximating OLS efficiency. 
Table 6 presents the findings for both cash pay and total compensation. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, it is found that union presence substantially decreases intra-firm remuneration 
differentials between the CEO and the top managers, in terms of both cash pay and total 
compensation. In particular, union presence is found to decrease the median (average) cash pay 
differential by 8% (6%) for unionized firms. The respective median (average) estimate for total 
compensation differential is 10% (14%) for unionized firms.  
Figure 4 captures the notable heterogeneity in the union effect across different levels of 
compensation differentials, utilizing the quantile regression for specification [4]. The union 
estimates are considerably different across lower and higher quantiles, thus verifying that firms 
with union presence avoid a large remuneration differential, effectively reducing the 
remuneration dispersion between the CEO and the lower-level employees. For example, the 
union presence estimate for the ‘Distance in Cash-Pay’ is statistically insignificant at the 0.3 
quantile, but negative (-12%) and highly statistically at the 0.7 quantile. Similarly, in the case of 
‘Distance in Total Compensation’, the union presence relation is statistically insignificant at the 
0.3 quantile, but negative (-20%) and highly statistically at the 0.7 quantile. Finally, besides 
union presence, three control variables are found to have a statistically significant and sizeable   26
estimate across regressions, namely CEO/Chairman duality, Managers’ board membership, and 
firm size. These results for the control variables underline the monetary premium of board 
responsibilities and the increasing complexity of larger firms.  
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 4 here] 
 
5.4.2.  Unions and compression of executive compensation across firms 
In this sub-section we examine the relation between union presence and the entire distribution of 
executive compensation. This is because one of the most pervasive union effects is often not 
confined to wage-premium, but to the compression of the overall distribution of wages across 
firms (Card, 2001; Card et al. 2003; DiNardo et al., 1996).  
In assessing inter-firm variation in the distribution of executive compensation, we measure 
the dispersion in the remuneration awarded to executives (CEO and Managers) in unionized and 
non-unionized firms. As discussed in Section 4.2, we effectively compare compensation 
distributions using two comparable populations of executives where the key differentiating factor 
is union presence in the firm. Dispersion of remuneration within each group of executives is 
measured with three indices, namely the Gini coefficient, the Theil entropy measure and the 
standard deviation of logs. The motivation for using multiple dispersion measures is that they 
have different degrees of decomposability among population subgroups, different emphases of 
distribution transfers, and possibly intersecting Lorenz curves. Also, the three aforementioned 
indices were utilized by DiNardo et al. (1996) to examine the effect of unions on US wage 
dispersion and provide a set of comparable findings. The large sample properties of these indices 
allow us not only to consider their point estimates, but also to apply statistical inference 
procedures in order to test for differences in the dispersion indices between the matched samples 
(Mills and Zandvakili, 1997).   27
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The results in Table 7 indicate that union presence is associated with a compressed cash 
pay distribution for both CEOs (Panel A) and Managers (Panel B). For instance, in the case of 
CEOs (Managers) the Gini coefficient for cash pay in unionized firms is 0.317 (0.311), while in 
non-unionized firms it is 0.381 (0.337). Despite some differences in each dispersion index, these 
differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. Regarding total compensation, we also 
observe lower dispersion measures for unionized firms, but they are not different in a statistically 
significant manner compared to those in non-unionized firms. Overall, these results further 
support Freeman’s (1980, 1982) long-held assertion that a primary objective of trade unions is to 
reduce wage dispersion in terms of standard rates, such as base salary and ‘capped’ accounting-
based bonuses in the case of executives. 
 
6.   Discussion 
In this paper we demonstrate that union presence is associated with moderately lower levels of 
total compensation for executives, though with quite different magnitudes for cash pay and stock 
options. The negative association between union presence and executive remuneration is also 
found to be stronger the higher-up in the remuneration distribution ladder one moves. In 
addition, we find no evidence of lower elasticity of executive cash pay to firm performance, a 
finding that runs against one of the predictions of the implicit regulation hypothesis. 
These results confirm a traditional picture of what unions do. Unionism at the firm-level 
appears to have similar effects for top executives as those found for workers, in that it decreases 
performance-based awards and reduces fixed-salary dispersion. These findings are consistent   28
with Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) view of unions as institutional channels of worker demands, 
legitimate or otherwise, for a more compressed distribution of income inside the workplace.  
Our findings could also offer a new perspective on international differences in CEO 
compensation. Abowd and Bognanno (1995) studied executive compensation in twelve OECD 
countries for the period 1984-92 and found that CEO compensation in the United States was 
substantially larger than that of comparable companies in other advanced OECD countries. 
Moreover, they showed that this difference was due to the greater value of stock-related 
compensation in the United States, a phenomenon that is not replicated in other OECD 
countries.
29 Since it appears that the mere presence of a union within a firm restrains the value of 
stock options awarded to the CEO, it seems likely that stronger (and often more militant) unions 
– like those found in and most European countries – can have an important restraining effect on 
executive compensation, and in particular over the growth of CEO stock option compensation. 
The presence of stronger union movements in most OECD countries could therefore be one 
important reason keeping average CEO compensation lower than that in the United States.  
Notably, the findings in this paper draw a clear distinction between pressures from unions 
and regulation since regulatory oversight in specific industries (such as utilities) has been found 
to dramatically reduce all aspects of executive compensation, as well as inhibit the alignment of 
executive incentives to firm performance. The difference between these two ‘implicit regulators’ 
could be attributed to the fact that utility firms typically operate in local monopoly markets, 
while many unionized firms operate in competitive environments subject to product market 
pressures thus having to compete in the labor market for executives with other non-unionized 
                                                 
29 Weak union presence is not discussed explicitly as a cause of greater stock option value for CEOs in the United 
States. The dominant explanation is that stock option awards were influenced by more favorable accounting and 
tax treatment (Abowd and Bognanno, 1995; Conyon and Murphy, 2002) and weak corporate governance 
arrangements (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Core et al., 1999).   29
firms in their respective industry. It appears that by restricting only the right tail of the executive 
remuneration distribution, unionized firms can effectively compete in the executive labor market. 
In a similar fashion, the disproportionate union estimate across the conditional distribution 
of total compensation may not be detrimental given the decreasing incentive power of stock 
options. Tian (2004) argues that at high levels of stock option exposure, stock based 
compensation can become wasteful and unproductive due to rising agency costs and the 
excessive levels of risk that executives have to bear since executives cannot sell or hedge their 
stock options. He further suggests that stock options generate incentives to increase 
shareholders’ wealth only if executive’s option wealth, as a fraction of total wealth, does not 
exceed an optimal threshold. Thus, union presence within a firm can perhaps inadvertently, 
by curbing extremely  large stock  option payouts,  keep  option wealth closer to  an optimal 
threshold, thereby maintaining the incentive power of stock option design. 
 Overall, our findings serve as an impetus for further work on the interaction between labor 
institutions and executive remuneration, especially that of middle-level managers whose 
compensation information is not typically disclosed. Future work should focus on whether the 
estimates presented here are moderated by factors like union strength and membership 
militancy.
30 Another important topic for future work is testing whether unionized firms offer 
executives more promotion-based incentives or a lower stock-option forfeiture probability in 
order to counterbalance the lower stock-option compensation. 
                                                 
30 Notably, during our sample period, labor relations at the macro-level in the United States remained stable without 
any disputes spikes. This is based on indicators from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the IMD World 
Competitiveness Yearbook on work stoppages, industrial disputes and quality of labor relations.   30
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FIGURE 1 
EVOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION IN S&P 1500 FIRMS (1993-2001) 
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NOTES – The two panels illustrate the evolution of mean/median cash pay and stock option awards during the 1993-2001 period 
(separately for CEOs and Managers). The figures are based on the overall sample of 46465 executive-year observations and 







DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF UNION PRESENCE ACROSS THE CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL COMPENSATION 
 





































































































































.1 .3 .5 .7 .9
Quantile
NOTES – The two panels report the effect of union presence on executives’ total compensation (separately for CEOs and 
Managers), utilizing the quantile regression for specification [1]. The shaded region is the 95% confidence band using 
bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications).   34
FIGURE 3 
DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF UNION PRESENCE ACROSS THE CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF CASH PAY 
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Quantile
NOTES – The two panels report the effect of union presence on executives’ cash pay (separately for CEOs and Managers), 
utilizing the quantile regression for specification [2]. The shaded region is the 95% confidence band using bootstrapped 








DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF UNION PRESENCE ACROSS THE CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF REMUNERATION GAP 
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Quantile
NOTES – The two panels report the coefficient estimate of union presence on the ‘Distance in Cash Pay’ and ‘Distance in Total 
Compensation’, respectively, utilizing the quantile regression for specification [4]. The shaded region is the 95% confidence 
band using bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications).   35
TABLE 1 
UNION PRESENCE IN THE SAMPLE BY MAJOR SECTOR (%), 1992-2001 
  Union presence  
(Overall sample)  
 
Sector composition 









Mining & Construction  16.4 %  16.7 %    5.1 %  3.2 % 
Manufacturing 39.2 %  34.5 %    44.7 %  69.7 % 
Transportation & Com. & Utilities  28.0 %  25.9 %    13.2 %  5.7 % 
Wholesale & Retail Trade  22.0 %  19.1 %    11.5 %  12.6 % 
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate    2.9 %     1.4 %    12.7 %  – 
Services 13.6 %  10.5 %    12.2 %  8.8 % 
Other 7.7 % 16.7  %   0.6  %  – 
      Number of observations 





    
 
NOTES – The first column identifies the major sectors, while the second and third columns present the 
percentage of firms in the overall sample with union presence by sector. Sector categorization includes 
Mining & Construction (SIC 1-19), Manufacturing (SIC 20-39), Transportation, Communications and 
Utilities (SIC 40-49), Trade (SIC 50-59), Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (SIC 60-69) and Services 
(i.e., SIC 70-89). The few remaining industries are consolidated under the ‘Other’ category. The fourth 
and fifth columns indicate the sector composition for both the overall sample and the matched pairs 
sample of unionized and non-unionized firms. Finally, the overall sample contains an unbalanced panel 
with 46465 executive-year observations and 9293 firm-year observations from 2070 unique firms, while 
the matched sample corresponds to 7730 executive-year observations and 1546 firm-year observations 
(773 unionized and 773 non-unionized). Notably, utilities are excluded from the matched pairs sample. 
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
Variables Definition  Overall  sample  Matched  sample
    Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
           
CEO Cash Pay   Cash pay (salary & bonus) – in $million 1.07  1.62    1.08  0.91 
            
CEO Stock Options   Black-Scholes value of CEO’s stock options awarded – in $million 1.82  8.65    1.50  5.37 
            
CEO Total Compensation  The sum of salary, bonus, benefits, Black-Scholes value of stock options, 
restricted grants and LTIPs – in $million 
3.45 11.13    3.10  6.24 
            
Managerial Cash Pay   Cash pay (salary & bonus) – in $million 0.48  0.58    0.47  0.39 
            
Managerial Stock Options   Black-Scholes value of CEO’s stock options awarded – in $million 0.56  1.91    0.42  1.07 
            
Managerial Total 
Compensation 
The sum of salary, bonus, benefits, Black-Scholes value of stock options, 
restricted grants and LTIPs – in $million 
1.23 2.92   1.07 1.58 
            
Union Presence  Indicator variable taking value 1, if the firm has at least one unionized 
establishment, and 0 otherwise. 
0.26   0.44     0.50   0.50  
            
Executive is Chairman   Indicator variable taking value 1, if the executive is the Chairman of the Board, 
and 0 otherwise. 
0.17   0.37     0.18   0.39  
            
Executive is Board Member  Indicator variable taking value 1, if the executive is a member of the Board of 
Directors (other than Chairman), and 0 otherwise. 
0.22   0.42     0.20   0.40  
            
Ownership   The executive’s stock ownership of the firm, as a percentage of the total 
outstanding shares (excluding options) – in percentage form 
0.82   3.56     0.59  2.68 
            
Firm Size (Sales)   Firm size, in terms of total sales – in $billion  3.44   9.22     3.76   6.53  
            
Return on Assets  ROA is defined as net income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations divided by total assets – in percentage form 
3.79  13.50     5.79  4.64  
            
Return to Shareholders  RET is defined as total return to shareholders, including the monthly 
reinvestment of dividends – in percentage form 
21.56  59.29     13.08  35.53  
            
Firm Age  Number of years that the firm has been publicly listed.  26.11  18.92    31.42  19.85 
            
Rust Belt  Indicator variable taking value 1 if the firm has its headquarters in a rust-belt 
state (namely IL, IN, MI, OH, PA, and WV), and 0 otherwise 
0.20 0.40   0.27 0.44 
            
Right-to-Work  Indicator variable taking value 1 if the firm has its headquarters in a state with 
right-to-work laws (namely AL, AZ, AR, FL, GA, ID, IA, KS, LA, MS, NE, 
NV, NC, ND, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA and WY), and 0 otherwise. 
0.28 0.45   0.29 0.45 
 
NOTES – For each firm-year observation in the sample we have compensation data for the CEO and the four-highest paid managers. The overall sample contains an 
unbalanced panel of 46465 executive-year observations from 2070 unique companies in the 1992-2001 period. The matched sample corresponds to 7730 executive-year 
observations and 1546 firm-year observations (773 unionized and 773 non-unionized). Data was obtained from merging the Bureau of National Affairs’ Labor database 
and Standard & Poors’ Execucomp, using additional information from Hoovers Online, Dun & Bradstreet’s Online, Harris Info-Source on firm establishments, firms’ 
annual statements, firms’ official websites and S&P Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives. All level variables have been adjusted for inflation and are stated 
in 1992 dollars. 37 
TABLE 3 











 Manager  Stock
Option Value 
Independent Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]    [4]  [5]  [6] 
               












                  












                  












                  












                  












                  












                  












                  
Industry effects (2-digit SIC)
  Yes
  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
         
               
Observations  1546  1546  1546    6184  6184  6184 
R
2  0.470 0.543    —    0.485    0.585    —  
 
NOTES – Each of the columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present an OLS regression, while columns 3 and 6 present a two-tier estimation based on Cragg (1971). The 
specification for the Cragg (1971) first-tier includes stock ownership, firm riskiness (i.e., three-year standard deviation of monthly returns), industry effects 
and year effects. All dependent variables are are windsorized at the 0.5% (both tails), in order to reduce the effect of severe outliers. Total compensation and 
cash pay are in natural logarithm form. Due to the presence of a cluster of zero values for stock option compensation, we utilize the inverse hyperbolic sine 
function (Burbidge et al., 1988) that not only yields very similar results to those of the logarithmic function for positive numbers, but also keeps zero values 
in the sample. A constant term is included but not reported. The absolute values of robust t-statistics [z-statistics in columns 3 and 6] with firm-clustering 













Independent Variables  [1] [2]    [3] [4] 
         




















—  0.305*** 
(9.65) 
































        
Industry effects (2-digit SIC)
  Yes Yes    Yes  Yes 
Year effects
  Yes Yes    Yes  Yes 
         
Observations  1546 6184    1546 6184 
Pseudo R
2  (Centered R
2) 0.312  0.308   (0.411) (0.429) 
Hansen J statistic  
(p-value) 





NOTES – The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total compensation. Columns 1 and 2 present a median 
regression, while columns 3 and 4 present an IV (2SLS) regression. As instrumental variables for union presence 
we employ three variables: RIGHT-TO-WORK, RUST-BELT and FIRMAGE. RIGHT-TO-WORK is a indicator variable 
taking value 1 if the firm has its headquarters in a state with right-to-work laws during the 1992-2001 period, and 
0 otherwise. RUST-BELT is an indicator variable taking value 1 if the firm has its headquarters in a rust-belt state, 
and 0 otherwise. FIRMAGE denotes the number of years that the firm has been publicly listed. Notably, the 
dependent variables are windsorized at the 0.5% level (both tails), in order to reduce the influence of extreme 
outliers. The values of z-statistics appear in parentheses below each coefficient estimate (bootstrapped standard 
errors for the median regression and robust standard errors with firm clustering for the IV regression). A constant 
term is included but not reported. Asterisks denote significance at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**) or 10 percent 
(*) level.   39
TABLE 5 
UNION PRESENCE AND CEO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE ELASTICITY 
  CEO  
 ln(Cash pay) 
  Manager 
 ln(Cash pay) 
Independent Variables  [1]  [3] 












    
Observations 766  2454 
      
R
 2   0.124  0.063 
 
NOTES – All columns present OLS regressions. Cash pay is the sum of salary and bonus. The absolute values of robust 
t-statistics with firm clustering appear in parentheses below each coefficient estimate from OLS estimation. A 
constant term is included but not reported. Notably, the dependent variable is windsorized at the 0.5% level (both 
tails) in order to reduce the influence of extreme outliers. Given that estimating pay-performance elasticity requires 
dynamic information (i.e., first differences) that is often missing, we keep only 383 matched pairs of unionized and 
non-unionized firms that have information for both CEOs. Similarly, we keep only matched pairs of unionized and 
non-unionized firms with first-differences information for an equal population of Managers. For Managers, there 
are 142 matched pairs with four Managers in each firm, 179 matched pairs with three Managers in each firm, 58 
matched pairs with two Managers in each firm, and 6 matched pairs with only one Manager in each firm. Asterisks 
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TABLE 6 
UNION PRESENCE AND REMUNERATION GAP BETWEEN THE CEO AND THE TOP-4 MANAGERS 
   (Distance) Cash pay  (Distance) Total compensation 
  Median reg.  Robust reg.  Median reg.  Robust reg. 
Independent Variables  [1] [2]  [3] [4] 








































Number of Top-4 Managers in the 

































Industry effects (2-digit SIC)  Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
         
Observations 1546  1546    1546  1546 
Pseudo-R 
2  (R 
2) 0.173  (0.349)    0.122  (0.305) 
         
 
NOTES – The sample consists of an unbalanced panel with 1546 firm-years. The absolute values of t-statistics appear in 
parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Standard errors are bootstrapped to address potential heteroskedasticity 
(500 bootstrap replications). A constant term is included but not reported. The goodness-of-fit statistic (R
2) in Columns 
2 and 4 is derived from rregfit command in STATA. Asterisks denote significance at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), or 
10 percent (*) level. 
   41
TABLE 7 
DISPERSION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ACROSS FIRMS 
 
PANEL A: Dispersion indices for CEOs’ compensation in unionized and non-unionized firms 
 
  Unionized firms  Non-unionized firms Difference  t-statistic 
 Dispersion of cash pay       
Gini-coefficient 0.317  0.381  -0.064  3.50  *** 
Theil entropy measure  0.167  0.283  -0.116  3.34 *** 
Standard deviation of logs  0.315  0.441  -0.126  3.69 *** 
        
Dispersion of total compensation        
Gini-coefficient 0.510  0.553  -0.043  1.19 
Theil entropy measure  0.499  0.711  -0.212  1.30 
Standard deviation of logs  0.785  0.919  -0.134  1.93 * 
        




PANEL B: Dispersion indices for Managers’ compensation in unionized and non-unionized firms 
 
  Unionized firms  Non-unionized firms Difference  t-statistic 
 Dispersion of Cash pay       
Gini-coefficient 0.311  0.337  -0.026  2.51  ** 
Theil entropy measure  0.166  0.225  -0.059  2.09 ** 
Standard deviation of logs  0.293  0.333  -0.040  3.08 *** 
        
Dispersion of Total compensation        
Gini-coefficient 0.483  0.484  -0.001  0.07 
Theil entropy measure  0.472  0.475  -0.003  0.05 
Standard deviation of logs  0.650  0.680  -0.030  1.16 
        
Number of Observations  3092 3092    
 
NOTES – The table presents and compares the level of dispersion in cash pay and total compensation among the top 
executives for matched pairs of unionized and non-unionized firms. The overall sample contains 1546 CEO-year 
observations and 6184 Manager-year observations and from 1546 firms (773 unionized firms and 773 non-unionized 
firms). The matching process is described in detail in Section 4.2. In each Panel, the second and third columns present the 
three dispersion indices for unionized and non-unionized firms, respectively. The fourth column displays the difference in 
the indices between the two samples, while the fifth column offers the absolute t-statistic from an index comparison 
between the two samples. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) are obtained for each of the three indices. 
Asterisks denote that the difference is significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*), respectively. CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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